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 The US-Adriatic Charter, an initiative in the spirit of the 1998 U.S.-Baltic 
Charter, was proposed jointly by the Presidents of Albania, Croatia, and Mace-
donia to President Bush at the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002. It was 
signed by four ministers of foreign affairs in Tirana on 2 May 2003. The Charter 
as a diplomatic project had two objectives – to secure the open door NATO policy 
and to provide the framework for the cooperation and mutual support of candidate 
countries. It was successful on both accounts. The Charter partners made strong 
commitments in the areas such as democratic reforms and the creation of the con-
ditions for NATO membership. An additional effect of the Charter has been the 
very palpable progress in the relationships of the countries of South East Europe 
by improving the security conditions in the region. The US-Adriatic Charter of 
Partnership is a successful example of cooperation among small states with com-
mon interests. 
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“I also pledged my part, and I believe for NATO's part as well, that NATO's doors will 
not close behind its first new members. NATO should remain open to all of Europe's 
emerging democracies who are ready to shoulder the responsibilities of membership. 
No nation will be automatically excluded. No country outside NATO will have a veto.” 
President W. J. Clinton, 22 October 1996. 
 
* Paper presented at the 46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 27 February - 5 
March 2005, in Honolulu, USA. 
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“Every European nation that struggles towards democracy and free markets and a 
strong civic culture must be welcomed into Europe's home. All of Europe's new democ-
racies from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same 
chance for security and freedom and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe 
as Europe's old democracies have.” President G. W. Bush, 15 June 2001. 
 
Introduction 
 This paper deals with the political process created to maintain the interest in the fu-
ture enlargement of NATO – the interest of the candidate countries, of the US admini-
stration and of the NATO bureaucracies. The US-Adriatic Charter of Partnership is a 
successful example of cooperation among small states with common interests. The 
Charter created not only a positive relationship with the United Stated regarding the 
NATO open door policy, but contributed to the fruitful cooperation of Albania, Croatia 
and Macedonia in South-East Europe. This is a case in which institutions do matter and 
help structure political activities. This is the first description of this political project in a 
more detailed way. During the recent NATO enlargement and the creation of the Adri-
atic Charter process, the author served as the ambassador of Croatia to the United States 
and is in the position to provide some “participant’s insider” data and insights.1  
 
NATO Open Door Policy 
 It took ten years following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union for the NATO summit in Washington to take place and for Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic, formerly the members of the Warsaw Pact, to be invited to join the 
western military alliance. Along with this historic turning-point in Europe's military and 
security architecture the Washington Summit also proclaimed, in its final communiqué, 
an open door policy for future membership: 
“We reaffirm today our commitment to the openness of the Alliance under Article 10 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty and in accordance with the Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Sum-
mit Declaration. We pledge that NATO will continue to welcome new members in a po-
sition to further the principles of the treaty and contribute to peace and security in the 
Euro-Atlantic area.”2 
 Nine candidate states are mentioned in the Washington communiqué by name in the 
light of their progress in implementing the necessary reforms and democratization. 
Also, a decision is made to introduce the Membership Action Plan in order to speed up 
the process of accession. This is a plan through which the allies will give advice, sup-
port and concrete help and the member states will have an instrument that can be used 
 
1 At the time the ambassador of Albania was Fatos Tarifa and of Macedonia Nikola Dimitrov. 
2 Washington Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D. C., on 24 April 1999. 
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as a system of structuring their reforms. The MAP has turned out to be a successful 
mechanism of speeding up reforms, their implementation, control and evaluation. 
 The open door policy has served and still serves the candidate states as a guarantee 
that successful political and economic reforms as well as reforms in the military sector 
will be rewarded by an invitation. The open door policy was strongly advocated by 
president George W. Bush as well as Secretary general Lord Robertson and current Sec-
retary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. 
“The expansion of NATO has fulfilled NATO's promise, and that promise now leads 
eastward and southward, northward and onward... I believe in NATO membership for 
all of Europe's democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibility that 
NATO brings.”3 
 This policy secured the political vision necessary for internal mobilization, while 
shielding the allies from committing to an automatic acceptance of new members be-
cause such a decision would need to come not only after a consensus among the allies 
has been reached but also after a positive review of the implementation of the MAP, 
through a period of several years. The MAP does not guarantee membership nor is it a 
list of criteria to be met. However, it is a statement of reforms – political, economic, 
military, defense, security, legal (as well as a decision on funding these reforms) – that a 
state has decided to implement. The Membership Action Plan is a practical manifesta-
tion of the open door policy. The MAP rules stipulate that any decision on an invitation 
to join will be made on a case-by-case basis, after reviewing the accomplishments of in-
dividual candidate states separately. Nine states accepted these conditions and began 
implementing the MAP.4 NATO did not make a separate decision on the beginning of 
the MAP process; the candidate countries independently declared the commencement of 
these activities. 
 The Republic of Croatia was not a member of the Partnership for Peace at the time 
of the NATO summit in spring 1999 and was not able to join in the MAP activities. 
This was a time of political instability in the light of President's Franjo Tuđman's ill 
health, the international isolation due to the inadequate cooperation with the ICTY, the 
unsolved problems of refugees and the other consequences of the war and aggression on 
Croatia. In the region of South-East Europe and the Balkans Croatia was still a part of 
the problem. Only after the elections of 3 January 2000 and the electoral victory of a 
coalition of, until then, opposition parties, did Croatia begin the process of closer coop-
eration with NATO. Croatia was admitted to the Partnership for Peace on 25 May 2000 
as its 26th member.5 At the same time it was asked to take part in the North-Atlantic 
 
3 President Bush speech in Warsaw, transcript, June 15th, 2001, source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
president/polandvisit 
4 The nine countries are: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia 
and Albania 
5 General Secretary George Robertson's statement on Croatia's joining the Partnership for Peace: 
“Therefore, I officially invite Croatia's minister of foreign relations to Florence on May 24th and 25th in order 
to take part in the official signing of the document of admission to the Partnership for Peace. I will also invite 
him to take part in the official meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council on May 25th. By turning their 
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Partnership Council as well as the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The Permanent 
Mission of Croatia in NATO in Bruxelles opened in June 2000. 
 
Vilnius Group: Europe Whole and Free 
 In Vilnius, on 19 May 2000, nine ministers of foreign affairs from the candidate 
countries accepted a declaration on their common efforts and cooperation for the future 
membership in the NATO and the EU. A year after the first NATO enlargement, the 
Vilnius statement was the political resonse to NATO's open door policy. Its fundamen-
tal messages were the creation of a whole and free Europe through two processes of in-
tegration: the EU and the NATO. The candidate countries were willing to accept the 
values and the standards of these integrations and also bear a part of their responsibility. 
Cooperation and solidarity are not opposed to the accepted principles of individual as-
sessment of readiness for membership.6 The members of the Vilnius group achieved a 
high level political coordination regarding their common goal of membership in the 
transatlantic alliance despite their differences in size, economic development, geopoliti-
cal characteristics and historical experiences. Their individual assessments of national 
interests lead to the same conclusion on the acceptance of democratic values – personal 
liberties, the free market and the rule of law. This made effective political cooperation 
possible. 
 The Vilnius group concentrated the activities of promoting their national ambitions 
for NATO membership at the level of their ambassadors in Washington. There are sev-
eral reasons for that. First, Washington is the most important place concerning the deci-
sions on NATO enlargement. The US Senate was very reserved during the first round of 
enlargement. The American administration and President Clinton made a big effort 
along with the three candidate countries to convince the Senate that the ratification of 
the enlargement agreement is not only in the interest of the United States but in the in-
terest of NATO and Europe as well. Because of this experience, the Vilnius group de-
cided to unite their lobbying efforts in Washington and to concertedly pressure the Sen-
ate and Washington's political community, regarldess of the number of countries even-
tually invited. This lobbying strategy proved very successful because it not only aug-
mented the political resources of the candidates but also demonstrated a high level of 
union and solidarity – one of the fundamental values of NATO members. The activities 
of the Vilnius ambassadors from 2000 to 2002 were intensive and varied and the group 
managed to secure a high degree of visibility and efficiency that otherwise would have 
 
back on nationalist rhetoric and politics Croatia has become an example to its neighbors and an inspiration to 
all moderate currents in the region. By promoting peace and stability in the Balkans Croatia has shown that 
the future of the region can be a shiny one. By sharing our values, Croatia has earned its place in the Euro-
Atlantic family.” 
6 “While each country should be considered on its own merits, we believe that the integration of each 
democracy will be a success for us all and the integration of all countries will be a success for Europe and 
NATO.” Conference “NATO's Role in the Changing Security Environment in Europe”, Vilnius, Lithuania, 
18-18 May, 2000, Vilnius Statement. 
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been very hard to achieve through individual efforts. The end result surpassed all ex-
pectations. 
 Second, committed and influential ambassadors were a useful means of communica-
tion for the American administration concerning American preferences not only on the 
issues of NATO enlargement but on other transatlantic relations as well. By imple-
menting the open door policy, establishing a practical alliance with the candidates, 
helping them with reforms and supporting them in making political decisions that were 
not always popular at home, the US laid a positive foundation for an alliance with the 
young European democracies and, perhaps, through them also to exert some influence 
on European relations and the EU’s foreign policy. The majority of the political elite in 
the candidate countries as well as the domestic public opinion had a special attitude to-
wards the US, never forgetting the US role in the collapse of the Soviet Union which 
paved the way for their political independence. This policy was proved useful at the 
outbreak of the Iraqi crisis and the American military intervention. 
 Also, diplomats and the NATO bureaucracy in Bruxelles considered the Vilnius 
group as an informal interest group of countries without any formal ties with the NATO 
structures. For many European NATO diplomats, the Vilnius process was an American 
invention and hence their refusal to accept any formal and political ties between the 
Vilnius group and the NATO structures. For them, the MAP and the individual ap-
proach were given priority. The idea of mass enlargement, the so called “Big Bang”, 
which they identified with the Vilnius group, was at the time for them completely unac-
ceptable. The candidates' estimate that Washington was the major factor in determining 
the time, the form and the extent of the enlargement turned out to be correct. 
 Croatia joined the Vilnius group activities at the end of 2000. Because the group 
functioned around the principles of solidarity and inclusiveness, the Croatian interest to 
join was received well even though Croatia by that time had not been admitted to the 
MAP. The influence of the embassies in Washington on the national capitals, along with 
the support of the US, made it possible for Croatia to be invited into the Vilnius group 
at the first conference of the Vilnius group prime ministers. The conference in Brati-
slava was held from 10-12 May 2001 under the title “Europe's New Democracies: 
Leadership and Responsibilities”. Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia Mr. Ivica 
Račan spoke of Croatia's strategic interests in the membership in the transatlantic alli-
ances, emphasizing the principles of accountability, solidarity and the individual ap-
proach.7 The final statement of the conference congratulates Croatia on joining “the 
common dialogue” as an important step towards the EU and the preparation for the 
launch of NATO membership Action Plan. Further weight was given to this first meet-
ing by President George W. Bush's letter. Among other things, in this letter Bush says: 
“NATO must be open to all of Europe's democracies ready and able to meet NATO's 
obligations and contribute to Europe's security. No part of Europe will be excluded be-
cause of history or geography.”8 
 
7 From Prime Minister's speech “Our Shared Vision: Europe Whole and Free”, made on 10n May 2001, at 
the Bratislava conference of the Vilnius group. 
8 From the letter of US President G. W. Bush, 7 May 2001. Source: White House. 
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 Croatia's delegation received special support from President Bush who, in his letter, 
expresses satisfaction with Croatia's intentions of further integration in the transatlantic 
community, stressing its devotion to the principles of democracy, the free market and 
peace. 
 NATO's doors remained open, Vilnius 9 became Vilnius 10, and Croatia became an 
active member of the NATO candidate club. In two years, the Vilnius group held many 
conferences of heads of state, ministers of foreign affairs and ministers of defense with 
the goal of demonstrating readiness for NATO membership, solidarity and alliance, in-
forming the European and American political public opinion on the progress of reforms 
in the candidate countries and maintaining the rhythm of the process of the open door 
policy. The Vilnius 10 process kept the theme of NATO enlargement on the front pages 
not only in the candidate countries but also in Europe and the US. The spirit of coop-
eration and solidarity was strengthened. The attention of the American and NATO ad-
ministration was kept by reinforcing themes of “who, how, when”. A solid political 
foundation was laid down for the debate and decisions at the NATO Summit in Prague 
(21-23 November 2002).  
 
Completing NATO Candidacy List – Croatia and MAP 
 The implementation of the Membership Action Plan also meant achieving the for-
mal status of a candidate for NATO membership. After joining the Partnership for 
Peace Croatia began its international military cooperation and explored the possibility 
for the beginning of the MAP. NATO allies thought that Croatia was not ready for the 
MAP in the period between 2000 and 2002. Its membership was made conditional on 
the continuation of democratic reforms, the acceptance of a national security strategy 
and other system laws in the area of defense and security, the strengthening of those 
government bodies within the ministries of defense and foreign affairs that were to be 
involved in the matters of coordination and cooperation with NATO. At the beginning 
of 2002 the allies did not have a clear picture on how the second round of enlargement 
would proceed. Political instability in Yugoslavia (Kosovo) and Bosnia and Herzego-
vina was a setback for Croatia's plans because Croatia was seen as linked to this unsta-
ble region. 
 Croatia's speeding up of the MAP request was motivated by the expectation that the 
NATO summit in Prague was to be the summit of enlargement and that it would be 
good for Croatia to have the formal status of a candidate in Prague even if the chances 
of receiving an invitation for membership were very slim. The new government 
achieved democratic legitimacy after two years of rule and Croatia received the status of 
a formal candidate and the decision on the beginning of the MAP on 14 May 2002 dur-
ing the meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council in Reykjavik. Croatia was invited to prepare its first Annual National Program. 
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From September 11 to the NATO Summit in Prague 
 After the terrorist attacks of September 11, global security and political relations 
changed dramatically. American national priorities were redefined in two ways: how to 
increase homeland security and how to destroy the terrorist threat abroad. The dramatic 
change in international relations changed the domestic priorities as well. For almost all 
public policies, either domestic or foreign, the criteria of their success was their contri-
bution to fighting terrorism and increasing national security. Nothing will ever be as it 
was. The usual debate on strategic positions and interests, on the nature of the post-Cold 
War relations and who the enemy might be, on the unipolar moment of power, became 
irrelevant. The same would soon hold for NATO, its mission, capabilities and member-
ship. 
 After the terrorist attacks on the US, NATO quickly responded by activating, for the 
first time in history, its Article 5. The allies showed their readiness to oppose terrorism. 
For NATO to be successful it needs to be transformed into an effective instrument of 
security for the post September 11 world. The transformation of the Alliance needs to 
be realized simultaneously with its enlargement. The NATO summit in Prague needed 
to bring a new strategic vision that will be based on: 
• New capacities to overcome threats, most of all in bridging the gap between the 
military capabilities of the US and the other members; 
• New relations between NATO, Russia, Ukraine and the Partnership for Peace coun-
tries; 
• New members that need to contribute to NATO's new goals, secure its role as the 
key security institution in the Euro-Atlantic region. 
 The new role of NATO in fighting global terrorism was one of the components 
which the American administration hoped would form the new state of global relations 
after September 11. Mark Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State, convincingly pre-
sented them as seven themes that shape our world: terrorism, globalization, democrati-
zation, alliances and partners, weapons of mass destruction and free markets, develop-
ment and progress.9 The anti-terrorist coalition reinforced old alliances and created new 
ones. In this sense, NATO became a viable space for creating new alliances as urged by 
President Bush in the speech he held in Warsaw: “We should not calculate how little we 
can get away with, but how much we can do to expand the cause of freedom.” The 
Summit in Prague in 2002 already specified three goals: new capabilities, new relations 
and new members. 
 The new NATO agenda was identified and all its elements in place for a decision on 
a round of big enlargement. John Kingdon's interpretative model of shaping the agenda 
shows that all three main dimensions for policy innovation (the big enlargement deci-
 
9 Mark Grossman, “Seven Themes that Shape Our World”, speech held on 21 March 2002 for the 
National Newspaper Association, source: http://www.usinfo.state.gov 
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sion) were in place.10 Those dimensions are: the defined problem, the available solution 
and the favorable political environment with a clear political actor. 
 The problem that the Prague enlargement decision needed to solve was, among other 
things, to increase the capabilities of the NATO alliance in the fight against global ter-
rorism. The new definition of the danger: terrorism plus the weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Although these two threats are not new, their combination and the de facto usage 
in the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon made them even more dramatic and 
relevant.  
 The available solution had already been reached: NATO’s Big Bang enlargement 
will increase the American alliance in the fight against terrorism and at the same time 
consolidate the European region and move the border of stability to the east, which now 
becomes the space of new threats and a source of long-term insecurity.11 The problem 
was resolved partly. The candidate countries of the Vilnius group, especially Bulgaria 
and Romania, used this window of opportunity and strongly supported the US during 
their intervention in Afghanistan, acting as de facto allies. In this way they demon-
strated their political readiness to contribute to the fight against common enemies by of-
fering concrete military services to the US and later NATO military forces. The possible 
drawbacks in military interoperability, democratic standards or similar political condi-
tions were sat aside by clear and decisive gestures of genuine alliance. It was a chance 
that needed to be taken advantage of, while the reward would come in the form of an 
invitation to NATO membership. 
 The political ambience changed from the reserved to the ambitious on the theme of 
the big enlargement “from the Baltic to the Black Sea”. The source of earlier pessimism, 
the US Senate, became the main advocate of the big enlargement. President Bush be-
came the leading advocate of the big enlargement with the political concept of “Europe 
whole and free” by which the political argumentation was placed in a broader context of 
democratization and the undoing of historic wrongs. This leadership was useful espe-
cially when compared to the skeptical Europeans. The demands of the candidates, even 
all ten of them, could have repeatedly been rejected by the NATO diplomacy and bu-
reaucracy on the account of the unmet MAP conditions. Bush's demand carried a differ-
ent weight. Washington will once again be the place where a decision on NATO's future 
will be made. Washington’s political institutions began a serious media and political 
campaign for the big enlargement. With this goal in mind, the Subcommittee on Euro-
pean Affairs organized on 1 May 2002 a hearing on the subject of NATO enlargement 
inviting the Vilnius group ambassadors to present their views and goals of the NATO 
enlargement. For the Vilnius countries this was the first formal chance to explain the 
reasons for their interest in NATO membership but also to explain their contribution to 
the alliance. For the three countries that would not be invited this was a chance to once 
again stress the importance of the enlargement, even after the Prague summit. 
 
10 For more on shaping the policy agenda see: John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy, 
Boston, Little Brown and Co, 1984. 
11 The same opinion is held by Zoltan Barany: NATO's Peaceful Advance, Journal of Democracy, 
January 2004, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 62-76. 
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 In the summer of 2002 it was clear that Prague was not only the first location of a 
NATO Summit behind the Iron Curtain but also the place where seven new members 
will be invited to join. Albania, Macedonia and Croatia would not be invited to join be-
cause of their insufficient military readiness and the domestic political conditions. In 
case of Croatia, it was clear that only six months after joining the MAP, Croatia would 
not be able to meet the needed level of reforms and standards that had been achieved by 
countries like Slovakia. But for Croatia taking part in the Prague Summit as a country 
with good chances to be the first one to be invited in the next round of enlargement was 
a success in itself. What needed to be secured, other then a continuation of internal re-
forms and the successful implementation of the annual MAP programs, was a continua-
tion of NATO's open door policy. 
 Croatia lefto for Prague with the first year of MAP already behind it, with many 
activities in the Partnership for Peace already launched and as an active member of the 
Vilnius 10 group. Realistically, the strategy of Croatia in Prague and after Prague 
needed to secure a leading position in the next round of enlargement, to affirm the co-
operation of the three states that were not invited and to receive guarantees that the 
enlargement would continue. The tactic prepared for the summit was based on four 
main assumptions: 
• Prague was not a failure for Croatia; the success of each individual state is also a 
success for Croatia 
• We consider the procedure of choosing new members correct, based on individual 
accomplishments, and we expect that our capabilities will be assessed accordingly 
• Not receiving an invitation will not slow down our reforms; 
• Cooperation with the remaining two countries of the Vilnius group will be intensi-
fied. 
 In preparing for the summit, President of Croatia Stjepan Mesić published an article 
in the “International Herald Tribune” that among other things says: 
“The next wave of NATO enlargement will open a door for a number of European 
countries. We welcome this. Success for every single democracy is success for all, and 
extends the benefits of global security to all. It also encourages the countries whose as-
pirations still do not correspond with their actual performance to know that the ‘open 
door policy’ is not just rhetoric. In the new security environment, NATO enlargement is 
a necessity.”12 
 The final document, the Prague Summit Declaration, reaffirms the open door policy, 
and specifically mentions the remaining three countries as potential future members 
provided that reforms and democratization continue. For Albania, Croatia and Mace-
donia, the Prague Summit meant a new period of cooperation on the way to NATO. Mr 
Mesić, President of Croatia, Moisiu of Albania Trajkovski of Macedonia met with 
president Bush and thus symbolically demonstrated the new spirit of cooperation after 
Prague, not only between the three countries but with the US as well. The beginning of 
 
12 International Herald Tribune, November 21st 2002. 
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the process that six months later was officially known as the Adriatic Partnership began 
in this way at the level of heads of state. 
 
How to Survive the Prague Enlargement? 
 After the unexpectedly successful enlargement onto the seven new members, Alba-
nia, Croatia and Macedonia were faced with a logical question: What now? How to se-
cure the American and allied interest for further enlargements that may take place as far 
away as 2006? The question was closely linked to the future of the Vilnius group after it 
had fulfilled its main goal. The problem kad been analyzed by the ambassadors of the 
three countries in Washington before Prague so that the answer to it could be shaped 
during the Summit. It was clear that the motives and energies of the Vilnius countries 
would be redirected to the questions of the ratification of NATO membership docu-
ments and other preparations for the membership. Even though all the countries de-
clared their support for future enlargement and offered their help to the three non-ad-
mitted countries, it was realistic to expect a change in their focus, and that in due time 
they would completely lose interest in the matter of enlargement. In order to keep the 
political process alive, both by the American and the national administrations, it was 
necessary to adjust the experiences of the Vilnius group to the needs of the three coun-
tries and to create a political project that would be able to withstand four years of wait-
ing and non-decision-making. The main elements of the Vilnius experience: coopera-
tion, solidarity and individual accomplishments were the basis for the cooperation of 
these three countries as well. 
 The first initiatives at the ambassadorial level were made before the summit in Pra-
gue. Because the main lesson of the enlargement so far, other then those mentioned be-
fore, has been the decisive role of the American administration: it was necessary to se-
cure their support and to achieve a high level of their future involvement in the process. 
The first talks with the White House senior director in the National Security Council 
and the State Department (with the Deputy Secretary of State) showed that the Ameri-
can side had a positive attitude towards this initiative. The American side supported the 
idea of cooperation between the three countries not only concerning the questions of 
domestic reforms and adjustments but also the other pressing issues of South East 
Europe. The cooperation does not have collective requirements since there are no col-
lective decisions – all countries are assessed individually. Cooperation is a good politi-
cal option for the future. The US policy will be one of support and reward. The initiative 
was accepted as politically justified, symbolically worthy and timely. The form of coop-
eration was to be chosen by the candidates and no one would force their choice. The 
administration accepted the initial project and the first concrete result was a meeting of 
the four presidents in Prague, and a promise of the continuation of the open door policy. 
A strategic alliance with the US will provide added motivation and energy to the coun-
tries. A special press statement of the Deputy Secretary of State further convinced Al-
bania, Croatia and Macedonia of the sincerity of American support.13 
 
13 “Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage today received Albanian Ambassador Tarifa, Croatian 
Ambassador Grdešić and Macedonian Ambassador Dimitrov to discuss the NATO summit later this month in 
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 Some members of the Croatian foreign policy establishment were skeptical about 
the justification and usefulness of the cooperation with Albania and Macedonia. The 
difference in economic development, political stability and democratic standards 
seemed too large so that such cooperation would be an unnecessary burden and slow 
down Croatia on its road to NATO. If NATO were to accept Croatia as undoubtedly the 
first and the most serious candidate, this trilateral cooperation is unnecessary. In their 
opinion, collective arrangements always hold the danger of entry being stalled by other 
countries’ progress. The resistance of that faction of Croatian diplomats was not strong 
enough to stop the launched initiative, particularly because the individual approach was 
one of the main criteria of the enlargements. Croatia was often criticized in the past for 
its insufficient regional contribution and cooperation. The political fiction that Croatia 
already is a West European country and that it has to isolate itself from its eastern 
neighbors and the Balkans made enough political damage during the nineties. The co-
operation with Albania and Macedonia was a chance for Croatia to prove it was a para-
gon of democratic reforms and had a Euro-Atlantic orientation, and did not want to be a 
regional power or even a regional leader. Apart from the regional cooperation and the 
contribution to their security, this political process secured an alliance with the US re-
garding NATO membership. The initiative showed political potential and accomplished 
the initial, albeit symbolic, success in the meeting of the four heads of state during the 
Prague Summit. The alliance was symbolically presented to the public with a photo-op 
of the four presidents in Prague. 
 
The Charter on Partnership 
 After Prague, the three states started to shape their future cooperation at various lev-
els of administration and fields of action. In order for the cooperation of the three coun-
tries and the political partnership with the US to achieve institutional stability and 
structure “The US Committee on NATO”, a non-governmental organization active in 
the field of NATO enlargement14 suggested that a charter of partnership be written and 
signed. The idea of such a charter was inspired by “The Charter of Partnership Among 
the United States of America and The Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia and Re-
public of Lithuania” which was signed by the heads of state on 16 January 1998 in 
Washington. It was a charter of political alliance that made the cooperation of the Baltic 
 
Prague. The Deputy Secretary reaffirmed U.S. support for a robust round of enlargement at Prague and for 
NATO's door to remain open to those countries not invited at Prague. He welcomed the progress each country 
has made in carrying out its Membership Action Plan and urged that they continue their efforts. The Deputy 
Secretary reiterated U.S. Support for their aspiration to join NATO. He also welcomed their commitment to 
cooperate and support each others candidacies while reaffirming that each country will be evaluated on its 
own merits.” NATO Enlargement Dialogue, Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washington, DC, 
1 November 2002. 
14 The president of “The US Committee on NATO” was Bruce Jackson. Later, this NGO was replaced 
with a new one – “Project on Transitional Democracies”. However, its goals were mostly the same. This 
organization worked on the promotion of NATO enlargement and was often used as a link between the 
administration and the candidate countries. 
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countries on the way to NATO possible, strengthened democracy, economic develop-
ment and security in the region and secured the support of the US. 
 “Charter of Partnership establishes the institutional framework that promotes the 
furtherance of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, reciprocal support to the Euro-
Atlantic integration and common efforts designed for the consolidation of security, 
prosperity and stability within the region and the Euro-Atlantic are as a whole.”15 
 The cooperation of the Baltic countries as envisaged in the Charter covered a rela-
tively broad range of themes, from political and economic issues to military and security 
ones. The territorial links, similar development and the common recent past made the 
Baltic Charter a successful political frame for their cooperation. A draft of the Charter 
for Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and the US was proposed in line with this successful 
model. The negotiations began at the level of political directors for NATO cooperation 
and continued in Washington at the level of ambassadors where the final agreement re-
garding the text of the Charter was achieved. 
 Since the economic differences as well as other indicators such as democratic devel-
opment between the three countries are big, the Charter needed to provide the stipula-
tions that would not be too specific but that would nevertheless be concrete enough for 
some real forms of cooperation to take place. Croatia's primary interest lied in firmly 
establishing individual assessment of a country's success and a possible invitation to 
join NATO. In the final round of negotiations these formulations were added to the pre-
amble, on Croatia’s demand, and with the consent of the other three countries. The 
American side was willing to accept anything the other three countries were able to 
agree upon. The main American condition was to avoid a commitment that would re-
quire the ratification by the Congress or huge funding. The document was to remain in 
the jurisdiction of the executive branch. This suited the other states because it avoided 
complications and stalling the negotiations and the signing of the Charter. 
 The Charter on Partnership was called the Adriatic Charter which was acceptable to 
Albania and Croatia since they are located on the Adriatic Sea, while Macedonia agreed 
on condition it was referred to as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia but 
rather as Macedonia. Croatia was especially interested in calling the document Adriatic 
so as to emphasize the importance of the Adriatic in the process of lobbying for NATO 
membership. By introducing this term into the debate about the NATO enlargement it 
was hoped that the geostrategic importance of the Adriatic would be enhanced, and that 
consequently Croatia would become more important as the country that controls the 
north side of the Adriatic Sea. The Adriatic is also of great importance for Croatia's se-
curity, economy, culture and place in the European civilization. In this way the Adriatic 
Charter included all the important goals: the Adriatic dimension of the NATO enlarge-
ment in which Croatia has the dominant role and is America’s strategic partner. The fi-
nal text was accepted in Washington on 21 March 2003 by the ambassadors and deputy 
director for South East Europe. It was agreed that the signing of the Charter should be 
done at the level of ministers of foreign affairs. 
 
15 From the statement of the President of Lithuania Alirgdas Brazauskas, source: http://www.usemb.se/ 
BalticSec/remarks . 
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The US-Adriatic Charter of Partnership  
 The Charter, which along with the preamble has six thematic parts or 36 numbered 
articles, was signed in Tirana on 2 May 2003 by the ministers of foreign affairs.16 
 
Preamble 
 The United States, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia (partners) solemnly declare their 
dedication to a common set of values of liberal democracy. Because of this they have 
special obligations in promoting peace and multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. The 
enlargement of NATO is a continuation of the decisions of the Prague Summit with the 
goal of ensurig security and respect for all European countries and their citizens. This is 
why the partners commit themselves to cooperate in the fight against the new threats in 
the region and in the Euro-Atlantic community. 
 
The principles of partnership 
 One of the main goals of the Charter is the continuation of the open door policy 
which is possible only with American involvement. Because of this the first paragraph 
concerning the principles of partnership (article 10) is very important. It speaks of the 
permanent interest of the US in independence, territorial integrity and security of Alba-
nia, Croatia and Macedonia as well as of the support for their integration into the com-
munity of democratic Euro-Atlantic countries. The other principles are the standard de-
mocratic principles of the rule of law, respect for human and civil rights and liberties. 
The partner countries in the region commit to strengthening bilateral, regional and mul-
tilateral relations among themselves as well as with their neighbors Bosnia and Herze-
govina and Serbia and Montenegro.  
 
The common goal of the full integration in Euro-Atlantic integrations 
 The main political goal of the Charter is stated in this chapter: the readiness for a full 
integration in European and transatlantic political, economic, security and defense in-
stitutions. The partners are willing to shoulder their part of the responsibility in achiev-
ing the goal of a whole and free Europe. This Europe will be established only when all 
the countries become members. The US welcome and support the aspirations of Alba-
nia, Croatia and Macedonia for their membership in NATO at the first opportunity. The 
US feel that these democracies must get their chance for full membership. Aspirants 




16 The Charter was signed by: US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Foreign Minister of Albania Ilir Meta, 
Foreign Minister of Macedonia Ilinka Mitreva and Foreign Minister of Croatia Tonino Picula. 
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Democratic reforms and human rights 
 In order for the candidate countries to achieve full democratic standards as soon as 
possible, they pledge to speed up and hasten democratic reforms, strengthen civil soci-
ety and its institutions and improve the management of public administration. The US 
will provide financial and material help for achieving these goals. Special protection 
needs to be given to the rights of national and religious minorities, of women and chil-
dren. 
 
Economic reforms and cooperation 
 Because of the disparities in economic development between the three partners, the 
chapter on promoting market reforms is the shortest and most general. The partners are 
called on to continue building free market institutions and promoting sustainable eco-
nomic growth. They are asked to cooperate in creating a positive investment climate and 
economic opportunities, transparent privatization processes and other government deci-




 It is expected of the NATO aspirants to act as allies and to contribute to common 
and regional security in the process of their candidacy. The Charter binds the countries 
to consult each other if their territorial integrity, independence and security are threat-
ened. The US give full support to the partners' attempt to contribute to collective secu-
rity and not only benefit from it. Due to the new circumstances, resolute efforts must be 
undertaken to address the issues of border safety and transnational threats such as cor-
ruption, organized crime, drug smuggling, human trafficking, illegal arms trade and 
other forms of trans-border crime. The partners will coordinate their activities in order 
to reduce the dangers of political instability in the region. 
 
Adriatic-American relations 
 The signatories choose to implement a rich and dynamic Adriatic-American partner-
ship for the 21st century. This cooperation needs to strengthen their mutual relations on 
behalf of all citizens and to secure the basis of their membership in transatlantic struc-
tures. 
 The Charter creates only one permanent working body, the Partnership Commission 
that is to meet twice a year in order to review the results of the cooperation and to plan 
new activities. The national delegations in the Partnership Commission are led by top-
level officials. In the last few meetings the Partnership Commission worked at the level 
of ministers of foreign affairs of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia and the US Deputy 
Secretary of State. 
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 The Adriatic Charter was to be signed by the ministers of foreign affairs during 
April 2003 in Washington. This would secure its political visibility in the national 
capitals. The high political level of the meeting as well as it being the first important 
event in the context of the NATO enlargement since the Prague Summit would warrant 
the media coverage and inform the American Congress and other agencies of the ad-
ministration that were not directly involved in the negotiations. Signing of the Charter 
in Washington would bring many political and promotional benefits. After the Ameri-
can and allied intervention in Iraq in mid-March 2003, the foreign policy priorities of 
the State Department and the White House changed dramatically. The first months of 
the war were not a good time for the American administration to participate in such 
symbolic events. Because of this the signing was postponed until 2 May 2003. Secretary 
of State Colin Powell was on his way to the Middle East and he stopped in Albania for 
the signing ceremony and the meetings with his counterparts. For the US this was a use-
ful and wise decision. The region could be given some extra weight by means of this 
ceremony and Albania could be rewarded for its high level of cooperation with the US 
as demonstrated by its decision to send troops to Iraq; also, Albania signed Article 98 of 
the ICC which was greatly appreciated by the US. Even though Washington would be a 
more acceptable location for Croatia and Macedonia, their ministers came to Tirana and 
the Adriatic Charter was signed. 
 In the speeches of the ministers of foreign affairs the main themes of the Charter 
were reiterated: cooperation, solidarity, mutual help on the way to the EU and NATO 
and strengthening security and peace in the region of South East Europe. The Charter 
confirmed the readiness of the US to help the candidate countries along this path and its 
resolve to continue the open door policy. Secretary of State Colin Powell said that the 
Charter “will serve as a road sign to Euro-Atlantic integrations for all three countries... 
it confirms the resolve of our partners to work with one another and their neighbors in 
order to build a region of strong democracies that is fueled by an open market econ-
omy... it underlines the importance we give to their probable full membership in NATO 
and other European institutions.”17 At the end of his speech Powell said: 
“With my signature in the Charter today, I am confirming that the United States will do 
everything possible to assist the people of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia to reach 
their potential and together complete their historic journey to the heart of Europe.”18 
 
Implementing and Evaluating the Adriatic Charter 
 The US-Adriatic Charter was the most important political event and the most 
substantial form of activity related to the NATO enlargement after the decision in Pra-
gue. The American administration welcomed and supported it. It meant big progress for 
the region in which NATO only recently held military operations. The State Department 
published a fact sheet on their internet web site concerning the Adriatic Charter that was 
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circulated to the American embassies in Europe and served as the main source of infor-
mation for the interested public.19  
 On the day it was signed, the Charter was welcomed by President Bush in his report 
to the White House Media under the title “Charter affirms U.S. commitment to further 
NATO enlargement”.20 
 The Subcommittee on Europe, the Committee for International Relations of the 
House of Representatives of the US Congress congratulated on the signing of the Adri-
atic Charter with a special resolution no. 209. In his statement, Chairman of the Sub-
committee Doug Bereuter said, among other things: 
“As NATO prepares to admit seven new countries next year, it is important that these 
three remaining candidate countries are not forgotten. NATO's door remains open to all 
who are willing and able to assume the responsibilities of membership, and it is impor-
tant that the Congress assert that it is the achievements of Albania, Croatia and Mace-
donia that will determine when their aspiration for the accession will be realized”21 
 The public opinion in the three countries welcomed the signing of the Charter, 
expecting it to secure a political alliance with the US on the as of yet uncertain road to 
NATO. For the three countries it was a remarkable diplomatic success. The Charter and 
the activities that it will bring were not directed against the other countries in the region 
and did not violate, but rather reaffirmed their other international commitments and 
goals. The partnership was not directed against the candidates' European interests. The 
European Union countries did not voice any objections to the special relationship that 
the three countries were developing with the US even though the military intervention 
in Iraq was already under way. The NATO administration was indifferent at first but 
later applauded the cooperative effort even though they would consider the Charter and 
all the activities that came from it as local forms of cooperation that are not part of 
NATO’s institutional structure. The ministers of foreign affairs of Albania, Croatia and 
Macedonia would meet with General Secretary De Hoop Scheffer as the Adriatic Char-
ter countries only on 17 June 2004.  
 In the first year, the partners demonstrated a high level of cooperation on different 
political levels: meetings of ministers of foreign affairs and defense, parliamentary rep-
resentatives, and other government officials. It was a time of designing concrete pro-
grams, primarily regarding the question of military exercises and trans-border security. 
Besides the new trilateral forms of activity, the earlier bilateral military connections 
 
19 See: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, 2 May 2003. 
20 “President Bush welcomes today's signing of the Adriatic Charter of Partnership between the United 
States, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia to strengthen their individual and cooperative reform efforts as they 
seek NATO membership. The Charter reaffirms the signatories' political commitment to the values and 
principles of the NATO alliance. The Unites States remains committed to NATO's “Open Door”. U.S. support 
for the Adriatic Charter underscores our continued support for the shared aspirations of Albania, Croatia and 
Macedonia to full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.” Source: The White House, office of the 
Press Secretary. 
21 Source: http://www.house.gov/international-relations 
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were expanded into the trilateral and put in the context of the Adriatic Charter. The 
number of consultations and the extent of political coordination exceeded all expecta-
tions and was larger than the comparable activities by the Baltic Charter countries. After 
eighteen months the three states achieved the level of cooperation and coordination that 
made it possible to send to Afghanistan a joint medical team that would work under the 
ISAF. Without the Charter such allied progress would not have been possible. The po-
litical progress but also the genuine cooperation prompted the US House of Representa-
tives to make an important recommendation on 30 March 2004 concerning the prepara-
tions for the NATO Summit in Istanbul: “That NATO heads of state and governments, 
meeting at Istanbul on 28 and 29 June, should agree to review the enlargement process, 
including the applications of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, at a summit to be held no 
later than 2007.”22 
 Because of their partnership, the Adriatic Charter countries' prime ministers were in-
vited to participate in the ceremony of the NATO enlargement when the seven new 
members submitted their ratification documents in Washington on 29 March 2004. On 
this occasion President Bush said: 
“Forces from Albania, Croatia and Macedonia are also contributing in Afghanistan or 
Iraq – proving their mettle as they aspire to NATO membership. These three nations 
joined together under the Adriatic Charter, are building strong democracies at home 
that can contribute to NATO efforts abroad. The United States supports these efforts. 
The door to NATO will remain open until the whole of Europe is united in freedom and 
peace.”23 
 The success of the process has attracted the interest of the neighboring countries, 
Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were invited to the sessions 
of the Partnership Commission as guests. The positive spillover effect that the Charter 
has had on the region is already being felt. 
 Before 2 May 2003 and the signing of the Adriatic Charter the cooperation of the 
three countries was minimal and symbolic. The Charter has opened up many political, 
military, security and economic possibilities. Meetings, talks and contacts of the politi-
cal elites of the three countries have enabled prejudices to be overcome and the trust 
built. The positive outcomes of these activities were felt in the media which now in-
forms the public on the issues concerning these three countries more often and in a more 
positive context than before. 
 
Structuring Political Partnerships 
 The US-Adriatic Charter partners came to the NATO Summit in Istanbul expecting 
that their headway in carrying out reforms and cooperation would be recognized, both 
individually and collectively. Because Istanbul was not a summit of further enlargement 
the final statement could have only confirmed and welcomed the progress made. Even 
 
22 Resolution 558. Source: http://www.house.gov 
23 Source: White house, http://www.whitehouse.gov 
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though some countries, like Croatia, had set their sights much higher in the preceding 
months, the final result of the allied meeting was positive. NATO renewed the open 
door policy, recognized the progress the candidate countries made through the MAP and 
asked the ministers of foreign affairs to monitor the progress of the aspirants and report 
to the next Summit about the readiness of the three candidates. The final document of 
the Summit says in Article 25 (out of 45): 
“We celebrate the success of NATO's open door policy and reaffirm today that our 
seven new members will not be the last. The door to membership remains open. We wel-
come the progress made by Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Ma-
cedonia in implementing their Annual National Programmes under the Membership 
Action Plan and encourage them to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to pro-
gress towards NATO membership. We also commend their contribution to regional sta-
bility and cooperation. We want all three countries to succeed and will continue to as-
sist them in their reform efforts. NATO will continue to assess each country's candidacy 
individually, based on the progress made towards reform goals pursued through the 
Membership Action Plan, which will remain the vehicle to keep the readiness of each 
aspirant for membership under review. We direct that NATO foreign ministers keep the 
enlargement process, including the implementation of the Membership Action Plan, un-
der continual review and report to us. We will review at the next Summit progress by 
aspirants towards membership based on that report.”24 
 The partners of the US-Adriatic Charter have tried in their activities to be compati-
ble and interoperable with the main new goals of the Alliance which is itself in transi-
tion. The Charter’s regional goals – to broaden their activities, to improve capabilities 
and to strengthen cooperation – are also the main goals of NATO after the Istanbul 
Summit.  
 This has once again shown that institutions matter. Institution building on the 
foundation of an international political document such as the US-Adriatic Charter has 
shown that even in a short time (a year and a half), an institution can structure the be-
havior of actors and articulate and strengthen their interests. Institutions define interests 
and mobilize actors even when they are less motivated for action. In the next step insti-
tutions convert these interests to decisions and the decisions that are not mere manifes-
tations of political will result in some real action. The Charter shaped the candidates’ 
interests and transformed them into political action. Besides, it showed that action 
through an institutional format influences perceptions of the environment and the future. 
The aspirant countries successfully used the institutional resources of the Charter both 
for their common interests and for their individual goals. The synergic effect of the 
common will has proved to be very successful. The alliance established by the Charter 
has secured a relatively high level of permanent motivation and activity while the im-
pact of accident and contingent events has been minimal. Within this institution of part-
nership a specific political culture based on solidarity, equality and the respect of sover-
eignty is being developed. 
 
24 Source: http://www.nato.int 
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 Considering that the goal of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia is NATO and EU 
membership, the Charter was the best form of working towards this goal given the cir-
cumstances in the international arena and the countries’ existing capacities. Knowledge, 
experience and the skills of diplomatic management and institutional history that devel-
ops with this process will be priceless, not only for the fulfillment of the goals but also 
later with the new institutional arrangements and rules. 
 The Adriatic Charter partnership formed the candidate states as allies, assertive in 
their national ambitions but ready for solidarity. The US-Adriatic Charter became a 
brand for continuing the NATO enlargement. As with all brands, it brought more visi-
bility to its owners, attracted new allies and friends, raised self-esteem and showed ini-
tiative on the market of political projects. For small and relatively weak states emerging 
in the region burdened with negative political metaphors and symbols, this kind of im-
age is a dramatic improvement. This was indirectly confirmed by Secretary of State 
Colin Powell who said during the signing of the Charter in Tirana that now we must 
speak not only of the transatlantic but of the transadriatic cooperation as well. 
 
Conclusion 
 If politics was only perception as is commonly said, the US-Adriatic Charter would 
be an instant success. But politics is also an activity directed towards changing an un-
wanted condition or maintaining the existing one. The Adriatic Charter policy had two 
parallel missions: to secure the open door policy and to contribute to the conditions for 
the future membership of the candidate countries. While it is still early to speak of the 
second goal, the first one was accomplished successfully. The NATO enlargement pol-
icy continues and the US adheres firmly to this political platform. A state’s international 
activities have an important but limited influence on domestic politics. The commit-
ments contained in the Charter, concerning domestic reforms and the creation of the 
conditions for NATO membership, managed to motivate and focus the national actors. 
But the achievement of the second goal, that of meeting the membership conditions and 
standards depends on the political will of the countries to persevere in democratic re-
forms. 
 The political project of the US-Adriatic Charter has its limited and instrumental pur-
pose in ensuring the cooperation of the three states and the support of the US in their ef-
forts to become NATO members. Additional effects of the Charter are a very real pro-
gress in improving the relations among the countries of South East Europe, improving 
the security and the positive influence on the processes of democratic consolidation. 
Each of these countries has a special interest in developing a strategic partnership with 
the US on military and security issues. The Charter has been successful on this count as 
well. The processes of reform and adjustment on the road to NATO have an important 
intrinsic meaning for building democratic institutions for all countries, including Croa-
tia. Maintaining national sovereignty and creating a positive security ambience for the 
daunting reforms is the most important effect of these countries' efforts on the road to 
NATO. The membership in this alliance is the final confirmation of democratic legiti-
macy and the validation of stable democracies, free markets and dynamic civil societies. 
